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NOTES
court appears to be protecting the tax debtor from speculation
such as apparently existed here. Plaintiff paid only $425 :for
the property, while the conveyances derived from the debtor's
heir involved sums of $4000. Nevertheless, it is submitted that
the instant case presents a situation of conflict between the
above-mentioned public policy and the public records doctrine.
It would appear that the better result would have been to let the
latter prevail.8 3
Charles A. Traylor II
TORTS - DUTY OF INSURER To INVESTIGATE INSURABLE INTEREST
The plaintiffs .sued three insurers for the wrongful death of
the plaintiffs' young child. The plaintiffs charged. that the de-
fendants were negligent in issuing without proper investigation
life insurance policies on the child's life to one having no insur-
able interest. Each of the insurers had insured the life of the
child upon application of the child's. aunt by marriage, who was
named as beneficiary. The defendants made no effort to ascer-
tain whether the aunt had an insurable interest in the life of the
child, although agents of the defendants knew that the child and
the aunt lived apart and neither depended on the other for sup-
port. The aunt subsequently killed the child,' hoping to collect
on the three policies. The trial court rendered a judgment for
the plaintiffs. On appeal, held, affirmed. 'When a policy of. life
insurance is unsupported by an insurable interest, a risk to the
life of the insured person is created; and because of this risk,
the insurer is under a duty to take reasonable care'in ascertain:
ing the existence of such an interest before issuing a-policy.
Liberty National Life Insurance Co. v. Weldon, 100. So.2d 696
(Ala. 1957).
In the early history of life insurance, it was common prac-
tice for insurers to issue policies of life insurance .to persons
with little or no personal connection with the person whose life
was insured.2 Such policies were and are still sociallyundesirable
in two respects. A contract of this nature is considered an un-
construe redemption laws liberally. The object of the state is to collect its rev-
enues, and not to deprive its citizens of any rights."
33. Wells v. Joseph, 95 So.2d 843 (La. App. 1957).
1. This fact was determined by the jury in the instant case and there had
been a prior criminal conviction.
2. PATr msoN, ESSENTIALS. OFJ.NIsUaANCE LAW 156 (1957).
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dignified wager having as its object the duration of human life.8
More important, the person who procures the insurance and
names himself as beneficiary,4 hereinafter referred to as the as-
sured beneficiary (for purposes of simplicity) is given an un-
necessary temptation to murder the insured. 5 Consequently, most
jurisdictions have required, either by statute or judicial decision,
that there be an insurable interest at the inception of the policy
in order for it to stand.6 If none exists, the contract is held void
as against public policy.7 An insurable interest, generally de-
fined, is such an interest in the life of the insured that the as-
sured beneficiary will gain by the continuance of the insured's
life or lose by his death. 8 The term "insurable interest" has
always been construed to include a pecuniary relationship be-
tween the assured beneficiary and the insured,9 and today it is
generally held that close ties of blood in themselves are also suf-
ficient to support insurable interests. 0 However, a relative by
affinity, as in the instant case, does not have an insurable inter-
3. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 184 (1951) ; PATTERSON,
ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 158 (1957).
4. It must be pointed out that throughout the instant case there is discussed
only that situation in which the person named as beneficiary has also taken out
the insurance. A person taking out a policy on his own life may name whomsoever
he pleases as beneficiary, no insurable interest being needed. See Annot., 45 A.L.R.
1181 (1926). See also LA. R.S. 22:613(A) (1950), wherein it is stated that a
person may not take out insurance on the life of another unless it is "payable to the
individual insured . . . or to a person having, at the time when such contract was
made, an insurable interest in the individual insured." Under the wording of the
statute one could take out a policy on the life of another and designate a third
person as beneficiary. The third person under these circumstances must have an
insurable interest.
It would appear that there is no substantial reason why the rule of the instant
ease would not be extended to require an insurance company to reasonably investi-
gate whether a third person beneficiary has an insurable interest. The issuance of
a policy which names a beneficiary who has no insurable interest would create the
same temptation to kill regardless of whether the beneficiary or another person pro-
cured the policy.
5. 100 So.2d 696, 705 (Ala. 1951).
6. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 184 (1951).
7. Ibid.
8. Warnock v. Davis, 104 U.S. 777 (1881) ; Rombach v. Piedmont & Arlington
Life Ins. Co., 35 La. Ann. 233 (1883) ; United Brethren Mutual Aid Soc. v. Mc-
Donald, 122 Pa. 324, 15 Atl. 439 (1888).
9. Bush v. Victory Industrial Life Ins. Co., 165 So. 486 (La. App. 1936) (a
grandaunt having no reasonable expectation of financial support, no insurable
interest) ; Goodwin v. Federal Mutual Ins. Co., 180 So. 662 (La. App. 1938)
(creditor has insurable interest in life of debtor) ; Powell v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins.
Co., 123 N.C. 103, 31 S.E. 381 (1898) (partners have insurable interest in each
other's lives). See also LA. R.S. 22:613 (1950) ; VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF INSURANCE 183 (1951).
10. LA. R.S. 22:613 (1950); VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE
183 (1951). See Goodwin v. Federal Mutual Ins. Co., 180 So. 662 (La. App.
1938) (wherein it is stated that husband and wife are considered as blood relation-
ship for purposes of insurable interest. The insurable interest here lies because of
love and affection and the reciprocal duty of support).
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est in the life of another in the absence of circumstances which
would create a pecuniary interest."
Statutes which require an insurable interest impose no ob-
ligation upon the insurer not to issue a policy to one who has no
insurable interest, but merely make such policies unenforceable.
Thus, while the instant case could not be governed by those cases
predicating negligence upon the breach of a criminal statute,12
the question arises whether tort liability may be imposed upon
parties purely because they enter into an unenforceable contract.
While declaring a contract unenforceable represents, in effect, a
finding by the law maker that the social evil in such a contract
outweighs any advantage to be gained from its enforcement, the
determination of whether one is under a duty in tort to refrain
from entering an unenforceable contract involves a different
balancing of interests.' Although the social advantage of sup-
pressing the evil may remain the same if tort liability is imposed,
the resultant restrictions on a party's conduct would be more
severe than the social disadvantages which would result from
merely negating the contract. 14 Hence if insurers were required
by a tort duty to investigate insurable interests before issuing
policies, the difficulties thus encountered may discourage the
issuance of valid policies or substantially raise costs.
However, in the instant case, the court felt that the incon-
venience to the insurers in having to make a reasonable investi-
gation of insurable interest were outweighed by the interest in
11. 1 COOLEY, BRIEFS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 386 (1927). Brothers-in-
law have no insurable interest in each other's lives: Chandler v. Mutual Life &
Industrial Ass'n, 131 Ga. 82, 61 S.E. 1036 (1908) ; Lyon v. Rolfe, 76 Mich. 146,
42 N.W. 1094 (1889). Nor sisters-in-law: Hotopp v. Hotopp, 9 Ky. L. Rep. 649
(1887) ; King v. Cram, 184 Mass. 103, 69 N.E. 1049 (1904). Sons-in-law have no
insurable interest in life of mother-in-law: Rombach v. Piedmont & Arlington Life
Ins, Co., 35 La. Ann. 233 (1883).
12. The theory of these cases is that if the injury committed by breaching the
statute is one that the statute seeks to prevent, and the injured party is a member
of that class sought to be protected by the statute, the lawbreaker is to be deemed
negligent. See Janssen v. Mulder, 232 Mich. 183, 205 N.W. 159 (1925) ; Brown
v. Shyne, 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197 (1926) ; Hardy v. Dahl, 210 N.C. 530, 187
S.E. 788 (1936) ; Willett v. Rowekamp, 134 Ohio St. 285, 16 N.E.2d 457 (1938).
See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 286 (1934).
13. In Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598 (1889), it was
argued that a contract in restraint of trade, since it was unenforceable, gave rise
to delictual liability of the parties entering into it. The court quashed this con-
tention, Justice Bowen stating: "Contracts, as they are called, in restraint of
trade, are not, in my opinion, illegal in any sense, except that the law will not
enforce them. It does not prohibit the making of such contracts; it merely de-
clines, after they have been made, to recognise their validity. The law considers
the disadvantage so imposed upon the contract a sufficient shelter to the public."
Id. at 619.
14. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS §1 291-293 (1934).
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protecting human life. Because insurance companies normally
require proof of an insurable interest from an assured bene-
ficiary before payment of benefits, the court felt that it would
be no more a burden to require an insurance company to use
reasonable care before a policy is issued than after the insured
dies. The great advantage of imposing tort liability upon the
insurer is that strong teeth are put into a policy of the law de-
signed to suppress a temptation to take life. The responsibility
of preventing this temptation from occurring is placed into the
hands of the person best able to prevent it, the insurer.
The holding of the instant case is in accord with well-accepted
principles of balancing interests to determine whether a risk is
unreasonable. 15 The fact that the risk resulted from the creation
of a temptation is no novelty in tort law. 16 However, since the
concept of insurable interest in life insurance is a limitation on
the enforceability of insurance contracts, the use of this concept
in defining the scope of tort liability may provoke further com-
ment. Perhaps the duty imposed in the instant case upon the
insurer is so broad that it would lead to injustice in cases of
uncertainty as to the existence of an insurable interest. The an-
swer to such a possible criticism would lie in the fact that the
insurer is only under a duty to the prospective insured to make
a reasonable investigation to ascertain the absence of an insur-
able interest which would preclude the issuance of a policy.
There is no absolute obligation to ascertain the existence of an
insurable interest before issuing a policy. From the standpoint
of the protection afforded to human life, the rule of the instant
case may be criticized as too narrow. There may arise a case
where the applicant for a life insurance policy would have an
insurable interest in the life of the proposed insured, but the in-
surer would have knowledge of suspicious circumstances which
would indicate a danger to the insured if the policy were issued.
The rule of the instant case would have to be broadened to af-
ford protection under such circumstances. This could be done
15. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 928 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS 119 (2d ed.
1955).
16. See Filson v. Pacific Express Co., 84 Kan. 614, 114 Pac. 863 (1911)
(bailor failed to give adequate safety to goods tempting to burglars) ; Jesse French
Piano & Organ Co. v. Phelps, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 385, 105 S.W. 225 (1907) (de-
fendants left door open, making house easy subject for burglary). See also Annot.,
78 A.L.R. 471 (1932) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 448, Comment b (1934).
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by evaluating the risks and the conduct of the parties irrespec-
tive of the existence of an insurable interest.17
James Farrier
17. Several problems may present themselves if the instant case is adopted by
the Louisiana courts. LA. R.S. 22:616 (1950) requires the consent of the insured
person in addition to an insurable interest. If either of these requirements were
absent in a policy, the court would have to decide whether the presence of one of
the requirements without the other substantially lessens the risk so that no lia-
bility results. Another problem concerns whether the rule of the instant case can
be carried over into the field of property insurance. For instance, if a policy holder
having no insurable interest burned the property in question for the policy pro-
ceeds, the question may arise whether the owner of the property can collect under
the rule of the instant case. The answer to this question would seem to be in the
negative, owing to the distinctly different natures of the two concepts of insurable
interest in life and property insurance. While the insurable interest in life insur-
ance is designed to protect life, the insurable interest in property insurance was not
designed to protect property. In the property insurance contract, the insurer
agrees to indemnify the assured for whatever loss he suffers, that loss being tan-
tamount to the insurable interest. Hence the insurable interest here arises from
the principle of indemnity basic to property insurance, and was not designed to
protect property.
